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Abstract
Is visual reinterpretation of bistable figures (e.g., duck/rabbit figure) in visual imagery possible? Current consensus suggests 
that it is in principle possible because of converging evidence of quasi-pictorial functioning of visual imagery. Yet, studies that 
have directly tested and found evidence for reinterpretation in visual imagery, allow for the possibility that reinterpretation 
was already achieved during memorization of the figure(s). One study resolved this issue, providing evidence for reinter-
pretation in visual imagery (Mast and Kosslyn, Cognition 86:57–70, 2002). However, participants in that study performed 
reinterpretations with aid of visual cues. Hence, reinterpretation was not performed with mental imagery alone. Therefore, 
in this study we assessed the possibility of reinterpretation without visual support. We further explored the possible role of 
haptic cues to assess the multimodal nature of mental imagery. Fifty-three participants were consecutively presented three 
to be remembered bistable 2-D figures (reinterpretable when rotated 180°), two of which were visually inspected and one 
was explored hapticly. After memorization of the figures, a visually bistable exemplar figure was presented to ensure under-
standing of the concept of visual bistability. During recall, 11 participants (out of 36; 30.6%) who did not spot bistability 
during memorization successfully performed reinterpretations when instructed to mentally rotate their visual image, but 
additional haptic cues during mental imagery did not inflate reinterpretation ability. This study validates previous findings 
that reinterpretation in visual imagery is possible.
Keywords Visual imagery · Visual bistability · Haptic perception · Mental rotation · Imagery Debate
Introduction
Although visual imagery is phenomenally familiar to most 
individuals, its psychological nature remains elusive. One 
of the central questions in what was dubbed “The Imagery 
Debate” concerns the structural resemblance between vis-
ual imagery and visual perception (Block 1981; Kosslyn 
1994; Pylyshyn 2002; Tye 2000). On the one hand, it was 
argued that visual imagery operates on amodal propositional 
encodings that are transduced from perception and, there-
fore, functionally independent from (ongoing) constraints 
of visual perception (Pylyshyn 2002). On the other hand, 
it was shown that typical constraints of visual perception 
remain present in imagery (e.g., Shepard and Metzler 
1971), which fueled the idea that visual imagery shares 
common mechanisms with visual perception. Although, 
there is still much discussion about the degree of resem-
blance between perception and imagery (e.g., Foglia and 
O’Regan 2015; Pearson and Kosslyn 2015), and the role of 
top-down amodal processes (e.g., Langland-Hassan 2015), 
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there is a general consensus that imagery does not (only or 
necessarily) operate on amodal propositional encodings as 
was proposed by one of the main contenders of the classic 
imagery debate (Pylyshyn 2002). This consensus has been 
reached, in part, through behavioral evidence that suggests 
that visual imagery functions like visual perception (Koss-
lyn 1973; Shepard and Metzler 1971) in conjunction with 
neuroscientific evidence for iconic resemblance in neural 
organizations associated with visual perception (i.e., reti-
notopic representations; for an overview see Pearson and 
Kosslyn 2015).
Research that fueled the consensus that visual imagery 
does not only function on symbolic re-descriptions of visual 
information, is concerned with the possibility of reinterpre-
tation of visually bistable figures (e.g., duck/rabbit figure 
by Jastrow 1899, p. 312) in visual imagery. Recent stud-
ies have argued that this is indeed possible (e.g., Peterson 
1993; Mast and Kosslyn 2002), in contrast to a descriptivist 
account of visual imagery which argued for its impossibil-
ity (Pylyshyn 2002). However, due to some methodologi-
cal loose ends there is a need for more empirical research 
to further buttress reinterpretability in visual imagery. This 
study aims to provide a validation of previous findings that 
is currently missing, but necessary as to reach such empirical 
consensus. Furthermore, we aim to assess whether cross-
modal information via haptic perception can support visual 
imagery processes.
Reinterpretation in visual imagery
Bistable figures have two interpretations (e.g., duck/rabbit 
figure; Jastrow 1900; Jensen and Mathewson 2011; Mitroff, 
Sobel, & Gopnik, 2006). Reinterpreting a bistable figure 
in visual perception involves attaining a new percept (e.g., 
rabbit) that visually dominates over the initial percept (e.g., 
duck) of an object. Attaining a new percept can be achieved 
through visual reinspection of the figure that fosters detec-
tion of relevant spatial correspondences between figure and 
an alternate novel interpretation. The common approach 
for testing reinterpretation in visual imagery is to assess 
whether an object Z (e.g., duck/rabbit figure) that is visually 
perceived as an X (e.g., rabbit) can be reinterpreted when 
recalled from memory in visual imagery as being a Y (e.g., 
duck). In other words, spatial correspondences between the 
imagined figure and its novel interpretation are detected in 
visual imagery.
Early phenomenological characterizations of visual 
imagery held that visual reinterpretation cannot be a gen-
eral feature of imagery, since images are typically created by 
the imaginer (Sartre 1940; see also Dalla Barba, Rosenthal, 
& Visetti, 2002). Thus, discovery of a novel interpretation 
is unlikely since a self-invoked visual image is bound to 
the interpretation it was given when generating the image 
intentionally (Chambers and Reisberg 1985). If this is cor-
rect, visual imagery functions in a sense like descriptions, 
in that the content of visual images is tied to a mode of 
presentation transferred from one’s intentions (Langland-
Hassan 2015). As such, the functioning of visual images 
goes beyond the sensory image itself; they have a frame of 
reference (Chambers and Reisberg 1985), and are “images 
under a description” (Fodor 1975, p. 190l). Thus, on this 
descriptive view of visual images, it is predicted that dis-
covery of novel interpretations of images in visual imagery 
(i.e., reinterpretation) is not possible (Chambers and Reis-
berg 1985; Pylyshyn 2002; Fodor 1975).
If reinterpretation is possible, it would support a core idea 
of the Quasi-pictorial Account of visual imagery (Kosslyn, 
Thompson, & Ganis, 2006). One of its core ideas is that 
visual imagery functions like visually perceiving pictures 
(e.g., drawings, diagrams). Pictures do not have a fixed 
meaning—their meaning is dependent (amongst others) 
on an interpreter detecting relevant correspondences with 
other objects (Kulvicki 2014). Analogously, visual images 
may be like pictures, such that visual images preserve and 
bring forth the spatial properties of a memorized object (Z), 
without fixing the meaning that was initially assigned to the 
object (e.g., Z as X). Therefore, the quasi-pictorial account 
predicts that visual imagery would allow for detection of 
novel meanings in mental images.
It has to be noted that the possibility of reinterpretation 
in visual imagery does not necessarily support all core ideas 
of the quasi-pictorial account (e.g., Thompson 2007), nor do 
we think it is necessarily the only account that is in par with 
it (e.g., Langland-Hassan 2015; Thomas 1999).1 Rather, 
the possibility of reinterpretation would indicate that visual 
imagery does not necessarily function as descriptions, and 
allow for perceptual acts similar to pictorial representations.
Empirical evidence for reinterpretation in visual 
imagery
Is reinterpretation in visual imagery possible? The first land-
mark study by Chambers and Reisberg (1985) suggested a 
negative answer. In their study, participants were first famil-
iarized with bistable figures with several examples. Subse-
quently, participants were shown a novel figure; the classic 
1 For example, reinterpretation is not directly concerned with 
whether visual images are experienced as pictures (Thompson 2007). 
Nor is the question concerned with whether visual images are literally 
encoded in a visual format (e.g., retinotopic neural representations; 
e.g., Slotnick et  al. 2005), or also co-constituted by bodily re-expe-
riences such as eye-movements (Thomas 1999; Foglia and O’Regan 
2015). Nor does the possibility of reinterpretation suggest that top-
down propositional processing plays no role in functioning of mental 
imagery (Langland-Hassan 2015).
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duck/rabbit figure (Jastrow 1899). This duck/rabbit figure 
was presented briefly (i.e., 5 s) as to ensure that participants 
perceived only one interpretation instead of both. Results 
showed that none of the participants could reinterpret the 
figure in their visual imagery when told that it was bistable. 
In contrast, all participants detected the novel interpretation 
when drawing out their mental image on paper, suggesting 
that the failure to detect bistability in visual imagery was not 
due to poor memorization of the figure.
Finke, Pinker, and Farah (1989) expanded on previous 
findings by demonstrating that novel interpretations can be 
made in visual imagery by combining visually simple and 
highly familiar objects. Subjects were asked to imagine the 
capital letter D turned 90 degrees to the left and resting on 
top of the capital letter J, upon which they were able to see an 
umbrella in this new construal. Subsequent studies includ-
ing more complex figures like the duck/rabbit figure showed 
that such figures are in fact reinterpretable in imagery (i.e., 
Brandimonte and Gerbino 1993; Chambers and Reisberg 
1991; Hyman and Neisser 1991; Peterson, Kihlstrom, Rose, 
& Glisky, 1992). One of these studies using the duck/rabbit 
figure found that 40% of participants were capable of detect-
ing the alternate interpretation in visual imagery (Peterson 
et al. 1992).
To make sense of the inconclusive findings on reinter-
pretation in visual imagery, Peterson and colleagues (1992) 
argued that the outcome of these studies depends on how 
congruent the bistable figure example is with respect to the 
test figure(s). That is, the example figure that is being used 
to familiarize participants with visual bistability needs to be 
reversed in a manner that is similar to the test figure(s) for 
reinterpretation to occur. This would explain the null-find-
ings of Chambers and Reisberg (1985) who used bistability 
examples that required different reorientations than the duck/
rabbit test figure to detect reversal (e.g., down-up reversal vs. 
front-to-back reversal). Other studies resolved this problem 
using more congruent bistability examples that required the 
same reversal strategies as the test figure, indeed leading 
to improved reinterpretation (Brandimonte and Gerbino 
1993; Hyman and Neisser 1991; Peterson et al. 1992). With 
regards to the positive findings of Finke and colleagues, 
test stimuli involved very simple and highly memorized 
stimuli (i.e., alphabetic letters; symbolic representation) that 
do not directly compare to having to interpret and reinterpret 
iconic representations through visual imagery.
However, as identified by Mast and Kosslyn (2002), there 
is a methodological issue in all previous studies that pre-
clude inferences about the possibility of reinterpretation in 
visual imagery. In the previous studies, example bistable fig-
ures are consistently demonstrated before participants have 
to memorize the test figures (e.g., Peterson et al. 1992). This 
could have possibly alerted participants about the presence 
of bistability in the upcoming test figures that they had to 
memorize. Indeed, Slezak (1991) has found that participants 
who were familiar with figure bistability before memoriza-
tion of a second figure were able to detect bistability, but 
they were not able to do so for the first presented figure 
which was not preceded by a cue about bistability. In sum, 
providing a bistability example before test figures are pre-
sented renders it problematic to conclude whether partici-
pants attained the novel interpretation in their visual imagery 
or inadvertently already noticed (or were predisposed to be 
sensitive to) the bistability while perceiving the figure.
Mast and Kosslyn (2002) evaded the previous methodo-
logical issue by not familiarizing participants with bistabil-
ity. Instead, participants had to memorize the picture of the 
old woman/young lady depicted in Fig. 1. Bistability is hard 
to detect because the picture has to be rotated upside down 
to discover the second interpretation.
This was done by instructing participants to repeatedly 
draw the picture until they could draw it correctly from 
memory. Once memorized, participants were instructed 
to rotate their mental image upside down with the aid of 
fragmented visual cues from the original stimulus (also see 
Fig. 1). These visual cues were added as support during 
mental rotation because of the relatively complex nature 
of the old woman/young lady compared to previously used 
bistable figures (e.g., duck/rabbit). A total of 16 participants 
(out of 36 participants who did not discover bistability dur-
ing memorization) were able to detect bistability in visual 
imagery combined with visual cues (i.e., fragmented ver-
sion of Fig. 1). Importantly, additional participants were 
assigned to a separate control condition in which only the 
Fig. 1  Bistable figure (a) and corresponding fragmented visual cues 
(b) as used in Mast and Kosslyn (2002). The young lady/old woman 
(a) was also used as an example bistable figure in the current study
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fragmented picture was presented. These participants did 
not perform above chance level when asked to choose from 
a list of possible interpretations. This finding excluded the 
possibility that being provided with the fragmented picture 
was sufficient for discovering the correct interpretation, sug-
gesting that visual imagery played some functional role in 
reinterpretation with visual cues.
However, even though visual cues may not have been a 
sufficient condition for detecting a novel interpretation, it is 
possible that providing raw visual information directly is a 
necessary condition for making reinterpretation via visual 
imagery possible. Since it cannot be excluded that visual 
cues were a necessary condition for visual reinterpretation 
in Mast and Kosslyn’s (2002) study, it is possible that the 
descriptivist claim that visual imagery alone does not allow 
for inspection of the raw sensory image still holds true 
(Chambers and Reisberg 1985; Fodor 1975; Pylyshyn 2002). 
This presumption is further reinforced by the finding that all 
participants in the control condition of Mast and Kosslyn’s 
(2002) study reported that the fragmented pictures might 
represent a human face. As such, the fragmented cues were 
detailed enough to assign a semantic frame for further inter-
pretation (i.e., face), thereby limiting the functional role that 
visual imagery alone may have played in successful reinter-
pretation. Therefore, based on the available evidence in the 
bistability detection paradigm, it is still an open question 
whether reinterpretation can be achieved through imagery 
processes alone, without assistance by visual cues.
In sum, two main issues should be resolved to validate 
previous studies that have found reinterpretation in visual 
imagery to be possible. First, it must be ensured that par-
ticipants perceive only one interpretation by demonstrating 
bistability after memorization of the test figures has taken 
place. In studies with the most convincing evidence for 
bistability detection in visual imagery (excluding Mast and 
Kosslyn 2002), a bistability example was provided before 
presenting the test figures (e.g., Brandimonte and Gerbino 
1993; Hyman and Neisser 1991; Peterson et al. 1992). Sec-
ond, bistability detection should be tested in a paradigm that 
solicits a purely visual imagery process (i.e., without the 
aid of visual cues). Next, a further conceptual extension of 
previous research on reinterpretation is introduced.
Multimodal imagery: visual imagery and haptic cues
We have argued that previous research allows for the pos-
sibility that visual imagery might only be possible, or is at 
least improved, because some direct visual information of 
the bistable figure is available. In extension of this possibil-
ity, the present study investigates whether such direct sen-
sory cues (cf. visual cues in Mast and Kosslyn 2002) can be 
delivered through a non-visual modality as well; via haptic 
inspection (i.e., manual touch) of the bistable figure during 
visual imagery. Assessing whether imagery makes use of 
different sensory-systems dovetails with what Pearson and 
Kosslyn (2015, p. 10,091) have suggested to be one of the 
most pertinent questions today that has arisen out the after-
math of The Imagery Debate. Namely, “How many formats 
can the brain use? For example, do we have separate formats 
for motor, auditory, kinesthetic, and tactile information?”. If 
haptic cues indeed readily inform visual imagery, it would 
signal that mental imagery exploits multimodal information 
(i.e., visual and haptic).
That the visual perception system and the haptic percep-
tion system provide commensurable information has been 
found in a study by Held et al. (2011) who aimed to address 
Molyneux’s problem. Philosopher William Molyneux 
(1656–1698) posited a famous thought experiment: whether 
someone who was born blind and regained sight later in 
life would be able to visually recognize objects that were 
touched, but never seen before (Morgan 1977). Held et al. 
(2011) have negatively answered this question by showing 
that newly sighted people failed to match objects (sphere 
and cube) that they saw for the first time with what they 
had previously only felt. Yet, continued testing showed that 
people developed a multisensory awareness within a few 
days, successfully linking what they had previously only felt 
with what they were seeing. Thus, even though such sensori-
motor knowledge is not present at birth, humans are natu-
rally predisposed to actively discover meaningful invariances 
between information across different senses. Such transfer of 
information across the visual and haptic (i.e., touch) modali-
ties has also been demonstrated in other studies (e.g., Wall-
raven, Bülthoff, Waterkamp, van Dam, & Gaißert, 2014; for 
a review see Lederman and Klatzky 2009). For example, 
when people are trained via touch to distinguish what cat-
egory stimulus-objects belong to, they do not only show 
improvement when tested on haptic categorization, but also 
when tested on visual categorization (despite not having had 
any visual training). This transfer of information works vice 
versa, meaning that visual training also leads to improved 
haptic performance (Wallraven et al. 2014).
Considering the findings on multimodality in visual 
and haptic perception, it is not implausible that a similar 
visual-haptic multimodality exists for mental imagery. 
Indeed, studies on mental representations of hapticly per-
ceived objects show considerable similarities with visual 
imagery effects. For example, mental scanning times have 
been shown to increase with spatial distance in both visual 
imagery and haptic imagery (Kosslyn 1973; Röder and 
Rösler 1998). The same holds true for mental rotation tasks 
(Dellantonio and Spagnolo 1990; Prather and Sathian 2002; 
Shepard and Metzler 1971). People take longer, both with 
visual and haptic stimuli, to judge the similarity between two 
objects depending on the angular disparity of those objects. 
Additionally, overlapping brain activation in visual areas is 
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found during mental imagery for both visually and hapticly 
obtained information (De Volder et al. 2001). Given the ease 
of transfer of information between the haptic and visual sys-
tem as shown by the studies above, we would expect that 
direct haptic cues of bistable figures during visual imagery 
will increase successful reinterpretation (as compared to no 
haptic cues). That concurrent haptic cues would interact with 
visual imagery processing ability is further supported by 
research indicating that haptic perception of pictorial 2-D 
figures is readily achieved, but only when subjects are aware 
of invariants that exist between haptic and visual-pictorial 
stimuli (Lederman, Klatzky, Chataway, & Summers, 1990). 
This is illustrated by congenitally blind subjects who do not 
have any visual experiences with pictorial representations 
and have much greater difficulties to interpret pictorial rep-
resentations from haptic cues.
Present study
The current study assessed whether reinterpretation is pos-
sible without visual cues (cf. Mast and Kosslyn 2002) and 
whether reinterpretation performance is improved by pro-
viding haptic cues. Notably, we used an example bistable 
figure that has a reversal strategy that is similar to the test 
figures (Peterson et al. 1992; cf.; Chambers and Reisberg 
1985), and the participants were cued with this example of 
a bistable figure after memorization of the test figures (cf. 
Brandimonte and Gerbino 1993; Hyman and Neisser 1991; 
Peterson et al. 1992). Participants memorized the figures 
for 30 s.2 To assess the effect of haptic cues in detecting 
bistability in visual imagery, participants could freely touch 
the contours of, and rotate 2-D test figures by hand dur-
ing visual imagery (Visual-Haptic condition), after having 
memorized the figure visually (without touch). Furthermore, 
we also included a Haptic Control condition, wherein par-
ticipants hapticly explored one orientation of the test figure 
during memorization and the alternate upside down orienta-
tion during reinterpretation. This condition was included to 
control for the possibility that haptic cues were sufficient for 
establishing reinterpretation of the figures (cf. comparable 
to the control condition used by Mast and Kosslyn 2002). 
If visually imagining figures with concurrent haptic cues 
inflates successful reinterpretation relative to visual imagery 
without cues (Visual Only condition) and with haptic cues 
only (Haptic Control condition), this would suggest that the 
haptic system is able to work in concert with visual imagery. 
This would be an important finding as it would suggest that 
mental imagery does not operate on strictly “separate for-
mats” for visual and tactile information (Pearson and Koss-
lyn 2015).
Method
Participants and design
Fifty-three participants were tested (36 female, Mage = 21.33 
years,  SDage = 2.32 years, range 18–29 years). All partici-
pants were students from the Erasmus University Rotterdam 
who participated as part of a requirement of the Psychology 
program or voluntarily. Recruitment targeted native Dutch-
speaking students (N = 31) and non-native international stu-
dents (N = 22). For non-native students a translated English 
version of the Dutch instructions was used. All non-native 
participants were proficient in English, as they were enrolled 
in an international bachelor program instructed in English. 
In addition, no problems of instruction were observed with 
these participants during the experiment. This experiment 
was designed and conducted in accordance with the guide-
lines of the ethical committee of the Department of Psychol-
ogy, Education, and Child Studies, at the Erasmus University 
Rotterdam.This study had a one-way within-subject design 
with condition as three-level factor (Visual Only vs. Vis-
ual-Haptic vs. Haptic Control) and bistability detection (no 
detection vs. detection) as main dependent variable. Each 
condition was assigned one unique bistable figure, i.e., one 
bistability detection trial per condition. Condition order, and 
figure-condition assignment was counterbalanced.
Materials
Test figures and bistability example
Three different bistable test figures depicted in Fig. 2 were 
designed based on the “Upside Down” campaign from Leo 
Burnett (2015) retrieved from Google images.
These figures were the seal/doe, swan/elephant, and 
penguin/giraffe. We selected these bistable test figures as 
they were simple enough to memorize, but at the same 
time also more complex to transform than other bistable 
figures (e.g., duck/rabbit) potentially reducing the amount 
of premature bistability detection during memorization. 
We also wanted to use novel figures that were not used in 
previous research as to make sure that participants (i.e., 
psychology students) were not already familiar with the 
figures. A simplified version of the old woman/young lady 
2 Note, that the chance that participants perceived bistability during 
perception was predicted to be relatively low as the figure required 
a reversal in the vertical plane (i.e., a rotation). For example, Mast & 
Kosslyn (2002) showed that even when participants are given all the 
time needed to memorize (and thus perceive) the old woman/young 
lady figure, the greater majority did not perceive the alternate rotated 
interpretation. This is to be contrasted with bistable figures, such as 
the Necker cube, which can alternate perceptually within seconds 
(e.g., Kornmeier and Bach 2005).
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(Howard, 1982) depicted in Fig. 1 was printed on an A4 
size sheet of paper and used for the bistability example 
phase (the test figures were presented as 2-D cutouts in 
Fig. 2; thickness = 0.5 cm, length = ca. 16 cm, width = ca. 
21 cm). Each of the figures (test figures and example fig-
ure) had two readily perceivable interpretations. An alter-
nate interpretation could be seen by rotating the Fig. 180° 
(i.e., upside down). In addition, the test figures of the ani-
mals shared a structural property, in that one interpretation 
always showed the body of an animal while the upside 
down interpretation showed the head of a different animal. 
The test figures were cut out of high-density foam sheets 
and had clear sensible edges so that participants could 
derive haptic sensory information from them.
Demographics and control questions
Upon completion of the experiment, participants filled out 
a short questionnaire. Participants were asked for their age, 
sex, and native language. Furthermore, to assess partici-
pants’ beliefs about the nature of the experiment they were 
asked about the perceived purpose of the experiment “What 
do you think was the purpose of the current study? (If you 
have no idea, no answer is necessary)”, and expectations 
“What do you think the researchers are expecting to discover 
with the current study? (If you have no idea, no answer is 
necessary)”.
Recording equipment
Answers given by participants were documented by the 
experimenter on a laptop computer. Performance was 
recorded using a JVC Everio GZ-MG130 camcorder, to 
ensure that data could be re-checked if necessary.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually and were told at onset 
that they took part in a study about visual memory. The 
experiment consisted of three sequential phases that were 
conducted during a single test session. The three phases 
Fig. 2  Test figures in body orientation (a) and head orientation (b). 
from left to right: seal/doe, swan/elephant, and penguin/giraffe
Fig. 3  Flowchart depicting procedure of the experiment. Note, that 
order of condition and figure assigned to condition were counter-
balanced. Orientation in which the figure was presented during the 
memorization phase was randomized, as well as the first presented 
orientation of the bistability example figure. In the testing phase, 
eye symbols within clouds means visual imagery, and hand symbols 
mean (concurrent) haptic perception
Psychological Research 
1 3
consisted of a memorization phase, bistability example 
phase, and a testing phase (see also Fig. 3).
Memorization phase
In the memorization phase three figures were presented 
successively. In this memorization phase, participants were 
explained that they will be presented with three different 
figures and that they had to form an accurate mental image 
of each of these figures because they would be tested on the 
material later on. Each figure was inspected for 30 s. For 
the Visual Only and Visual-Haptic condition, figures were 
presented visually and for the Haptic Control condition the 
figure was presented via manual touch only. In the Haptic 
Control condition, participants could bimanually inspect the 
cutout figure through two opening slots in a closed card-
board box. After each 30 s presentation of a figure, partici-
pants were asked what he/she had seen or felt (depending on 
condition). The experimenter noted down what participants 
detected in the figures. If participants reported perceiving 
two or more distinct interpretations of a figure during the 
memorization phase, the associated testing condition would 
be skipped. It could also occur that participants would only 
perceive the upside down interpretation of the figure (e.g., 
the figure was presented with the head orientation, but the 
participant reported an upside down interpretation corre-
sponding to the body orientation). This occurred in 23 of 159 
instances, and we exclude these from our analyses as to base 
our results on the most homogenous sample.3
Bistability example phase
After the memorization phase, participants were presented 
with the bistability example figure of the old woman/young 
lady (Fig. 1), with orientation of presentation randomized. It 
was explained that this drawing was an example of a bistable 
figure and contained two interpretations. Upon inspection, 
they were asked what they saw in the drawing. After par-
ticipants reported what they saw, they were asked whether 
they could find the alternate interpretation in the drawing as 
well. If participants reported that they could not discover the 
bistability, they were instructed to turn the drawing upside 
down and encouraged to look for the alternate interpretation 
again. If they were still unable to perceive the bistability, 
the experimenter would point out the features of the alter-
nate interpretation until they reported that they could see 
it. When participants reported noticing the bistability, they 
were asked to point out the features of both interpretations 
so that the experimenter could verify whether they had actu-
ally perceived the bistability. It is important to note that this 
bistability example of the old woman/young lady is struc-
turally related to the testing figures in that they both have 
two distinct interpretations that are orientation specific and 
require the same upside down rotation reversal strategy. To 
reiterate, this example procedure was employed to make sure 
that participants were aware what visual bistability means, 
so that they effectively seek a novel interpretation in the test 
phase. Moreover, being familiar with visual bistability also 
fosters visual reinterpretation in direct visual perception of 
novel test figures (e.g., Mitroff et al. 2006).
Testing phase
Last, the testing phase was administered with the three dif-
ferent conditions. Participants were instructed to mentally 
retrieve an image of one particular figure from the memori-
zation phase (order of retrieval counterbalanced). Depending 
on condition, participants retrieved the mental image either 
through visual imagery alone (Visual Only condition), or 
through visual imagery with haptic feedback by providing 
the relevant cutout of the figure during visual imagery using 
the cardboard box (Visual-Haptic condition), or through 
haptic reinspection alone using the cardboard box (Haptic 
Control condition). Once participants indicated that they 
generated (or hapticly inspected) the mental image, the 
experimenter would inform participants that this figure was 
bistable. Participants in the Visual Only- and Visual-Haptic 
condition were then instructed to “rotate their mental image 
180 degrees upside down, just like the old woman/young 
lady, in order to detect the alternate interpretation”. Par-
ticipants in the Visual-Haptic condition were also told to 
physically rotate the figure. In the Haptic Control condition, 
participants were only told to physically rotate the figure to 
detect bistability through haptic reinspection.
Participants were then asked three consecutive questions 
in each of the three testing conditions. With each question, 
more information was revealed by the experimenter regard-
ing the correct interpretation (similar to Mast and Kosslyn 
2002). First, participants were asked the open question if 
they could detect the alternate interpretation in their rotated 
mental image. If participants reported that they could not 
detect the alternate interpretation, the experimenter would 
continue with the next question. Second, participants were 
given the category hint that the alternate interpretation was 
an animal and were asked whether they could discover an 
animal in their rotated mental image. The category hint 
3 Notably, participants who reported an upside down interpretation 
during memorization had already perceived and memorized the cor-
rect orientation of the alternate target interpretation. Therefore, these 
participants did not have to rotate their mental image in the testing 
phase to detect the alternate interpretation, despite adjusted instruc-
tions instructing them to do so. Since mental rotation ability likely 
plays a key role in reinterpretation in our experiment, preserving 
these participants could inflate successful reinterpretation rates (Mast 
and Kosslyn 2002).
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would be skipped by the experimenter if participants already 
reported an (incorrect) animal after the open question. Last, 
participants were given a multiple choice selection of four 
possible animal alternatives (see Table 3 in “Appendix” for 
the selected choices per orientation for each figure). The 
multiple choice question was always asked regardless of 
whether participants already reported a correct interpreta-
tion or not. This provided participants the opportunity to 
reconsider their answer when given a selection of possible 
alternative interpretations.
For each question, participants were informed that they 
would get as much time as they needed to provide an answer. 
Although not central to our research question, the experi-
menter also recorded the time until the participant reported 
an answer (Open 1st question, M = 42.21 s, SD = 29.43 s, 
range = 6–172 s; 2nd Question, M = 10.08 s, SD = 19.80 s, 
range = 0–123 s; 3rd question, M = 10.45 s, SD = 14.83 s, 
range = 0–77 s), or that he/she was unable to discover the 
alternate interpretation (Open 1st question, M = 83.11 s, 
SD = 50.40 s, range = 0–238 s; 2nd Question, M = 35.72 s, 
SD = 33.05 s, range = 0–103 s). During all three questions 
(open question, category hint, and multiple choice) in all 
three conditions, participants were instructed to keep their 
eyes closed to prevent gaze-induced disruption or modula-
tion in visual imagery (e.g., Buchanan et al. 2015; Markson 
and Paterson 2009).
Concluding the experiment, participants were thanked for 
their participation and asked to fill out a short questionnaire 
containing the control questions. In cases where participants 
detected a correct alternate interpretation in one or more of 
the testing conditions, the experimenter would ask explic-
itly if he/she had noticed the alternate interpretation during 
memorization or newly discovered it in visual imagery.
Performance and scoring
Performance was measured as a dichotomous-dependent 
variable (correct vs. incorrect). An interpretation given by 
a participant was considered correct in case this interpreta-
tion was also reported by another participant when visually 
perceiving the figure in that orientation in the memorization 
phase. For example, if a participant in our sample reported 
having perceived a cow for the head orientation of the seal/
doe figure during the memorization phase, then this would 
be considered a valid interpretation for all participants when 
reported for that figure and orientation in the testing phase. 
As such, participants served (primarily) as their own raters 
in the current study, in contrast to more arbitrary post-hoc 
experimenter judgments used in previous research (e.g., 
Peterson et al. 1992). However, four other interpretations 
were regarded as correct after a post-hoc agreement between 
the first and second author that these were undeniably plau-
sible visual interpretations for the given figure and its ori-
entation (view Table 4 in “Appendix” for an overview of all 
correct [post-hoc] interpretations). Note that these post-hoc 
changes do not alter the interpretation of the results.
Results
Sample and data elimination per condition
A total of 42 out of 159 (3 × 53) instances of reinterpretation 
per image (i.e., trials) were eliminated from these descrip-
tive statistics (10/53 haptic control; 17/53 visual only; 15/53 
visual-haptic). Of these trials 19 out of 42 were removed 
because participants detected the bistability of the figure 
prematurely (3/19 haptic control; 7/19 visual only; 9/19 
visual-haptic) during the memorization phase (i.e., reported 
two interpretations; one interpretation in the orientation pre-
sented, and another upside down interpretation correspond-
ing to the 180 degree rotated orientation). The other 23 trials 
(7/23 haptic control; 10/23 visual only; 6/23 visual-haptic) 
were removed because they reported an interpretation dur-
ing the memorization phase that corresponded to the upside 
down orientation from the participant’s perspective.
Descriptives successful reinterpretation
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics showing the occur-
rence and rate of successful reinterpretations per condition. 
The key dependent variable of interest here is the percent-
age of successful reinterpretations (i.e., participants who 
provided a correct alternative interpretation) in the visual 
imagery condition for the open question (i.e., asking to find 
the alternate interpretation without any hints).
Table 1  Performance for Each Question Type per Test Condition
Test condition Open question Category hint Multiple choice
Visual only 11/36 (30.6%) 13/36 (36.1%) 22/36 (61.1%)
Visual-haptic 18/38 (47.4%) 16/38 (42.1%) 27/38 (71.1%)
Haptic control 14/43 (32.6%) 14/43 (32.6%) 30/43 (69.8%)
Total average 
scores
36.9% 36.9% 67.3%
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Differences in performance between testing 
conditions
Three confirmatory statistical tests were performed using a 
Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of 0.0167 per test (0.05/3). 
We hypothesized that haptic cues in the visual-haptic condi-
tion would lead to increased performance compared to the 
visual only condition and the haptic control condition. We 
compared the three test conditions (within-subjects) for the 
open question, the category hint, and the multiple choice 
question, with the key dependent variables of interest being 
the amount of successful reinterpretation in each test condi-
tion for the open question. For the open question, perfor-
mance was 30.6% reinterpretation (N = 25) in the visual only 
condition, 47.4% reinterpretation (N = 25) in the Visual-
haptic condition, and 32.6% reinterpretation (N = 25) in the 
haptic control condition. A Cochran’s Q test was performed, 
which tests differences in proportion for paired categorical 
data with more than two groups. A Cochran’s Q test showed 
that there was no statistically significant difference in suc-
cessful reinterpretation between the different testing condi-
tions, χ2(2) = 1.125, p = .570. Similarly, there were also no 
significant differences in performance found between test-
ing conditions for the category hint,χ2(2) = 1.412, p = .494, 
nor for the multiple choice selection, χ2(2) = 2.471, p = .291. 
Thus, regardless of test condition, participants showed no 
improvement in performance for the open question, category 
hint, and multiple choice selection.4
Differences in performance between figures
Using an alpha level of 0.05, we also looked at differences 
in performance for the open question between the three fig-
ures, regardless of test condition. Performance for the open 
question was 20% reinterpretation for the seal/doe figure, 
68.6% reinterpretation for the swan/elephant figure, and 
28.6% reinterpretation for the penguin/giraffe figure, regard-
less of test condition. A Cochran’s Q test revealed that there 
was a statistically significant difference in performance 
between the three testing figures, χ2(2) = 15.125, p < .001. 
Pairwise comparisons using a Bonferroni correction of 
p = .0167 (0.05/3) revealed no significant difference in per-
formance for the seal/doe figure compared to the penguin/
giraffe figure, χ2(1) = 0.692, p = .405. However, a pairwise 
comparison between the seal/doe figure and swan/elephant 
figure revealed a significant difference in performance, 
χ2(1) = 8.067, p = .005. In addition to this, a significant dif-
ference in performance was also found between the pen-
guin/giraffe figure and swan/elephant figure, χ2(1) = 12.250, 
p < .001. Table 2 shows the performance for each figure per 
question type and test condition. We refer to the “Appen-
dix” (Table 6) for a comprehensive table showing perfor-
mance for both orientations of each figure (head and body 
orientation) for each subsequent question in all three testing 
conditions.
Discussion
The current study has two main findings. First, when con-
trolling for premature bistability detection during memori-
zation reinterpretation in visual imagery is possible without 
visual cues. Eleven out of the 36 participants (30.6%), who 
were not aware of bistability during memorization, reported 
Table 2  Performance for each 
figure per question type and test 
condition
The percentage of detection rates are shown for each separate figure regardless of presented orientation in 
the memorization/retrieval phase
Question type test condition Seal/Doe figure Swan/elephant figure Penguin/giraffe figure
Open question
Visual only 2/11 (18.2%) 6/9 (66.7%) 3/16 (18.8%)
Visual-haptic 5/15 (33.3%) 8/11 (72.7%) 5/12 (41.7%)
Haptic control 2/14 (14.3%) 8/15 (53.3%) 4/14 (28.6%)
Category hint
Visual only 2/11 (18.2%) 4/9 (44.4%) 7/16 (43.8%)
Visual-haptic 5/15 (33.3%) 5/11 (45.5%) 6/12 (50.0%)
Haptic control 2/14 (14.3%) 8/15 (53.3%) 4/14 (28.6%)
Multiple choice
Visual imagery only 5/11 (45.5%) 5/9 (55.6%) 11/16 (68.8%)
Visual-haptic 8/15 (53.3%) 10/11 (90.9%) 9/12 (75.0%)
Haptic control 7/14 (50.0%) 13/15 (86.7%) 10/14 (71.4%)
4 Note that we did not find statistically significant relationship 
between native language (i.e., native, non-native) and reinterpretation 
(open question) in visual imagery, χ2 (1, N = 36) = 1.89, p = .169). See 
Appendix C for descriptives.
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a novel interpretation when imagining a bistable figure. This 
is despite the fact that all these participants assigned a dif-
ferent interpretation (i.e., percept) to the figure during direct 
visual inspection in the memorization phase.
It remains unclear whether providing haptic cues of a 
bistable figure concurrent with visual imagery of that bista-
ble figure improves successful reinterpretation (as opposed 
to without haptic support). There was no statistically sig-
nificant difference in the amount of successful reinterpreta-
tion for the visual-haptic condition when compared to the 
visual only condition, or the haptic control condition. In the 
next section, we will contextualize the current study, point 
out some possible shortcomings, and finally conclude with 
implications.
Reinterpretation in visual imagery is possible 
without visual cues
Some previous studies have claimed that reinterpretation in 
visual imagery is impossible (Chambers and Reisberg 1985; 
Slezak 1991) whereas others provided evidence in favor of 
successful reinterpretation. Importantly, the current study 
replicates previous findings from studies that suggest bista-
bility detection is possible, and distinguishes itself in several 
ways from these previous studies (Brandimonte and Gerbino 
1993; Finke et al. 1989; Hyman and Neisser 1991; Mast and 
Kosslyn 2002; Peterson et al. 1992).
First, in the current study the bistability example was 
shown after participants had visually memorized the test 
figures. Therefore, participants were not led to expect 
bistability in the test figures during direct visual or haptic 
inspection in the memorization phase (cf. Brandimonte and 
Gerbino 1993; Chambers and Reisberg 1985; Finke et al. 
1989; Hyman and Neisser 1991; Peterson et al. 1992; Slezak 
1991). Second, the current bistability example involved a 
reversal strategy congruent with the test figures (180° rota-
tion). This congruence ensures a sufficient understanding 
of the reversal procedure. The current positive finding may, 
therefore, contrast with studies that deemed reinterpretation 
in visual imagery impossible, since these studies used exem-
plars that did not match reversal properties of the test figure 
(as argued by Peterson et al. 1992). Last, the current study 
expands on the findings by Mast and Kosslyn (2002), by 
showing that reinterpretation in visual imagery is possible 
without visual support. This is an important extension as 
we can now exclude the possibility that direct visual input 
during visual imagery is a necessary condition for successful 
reinterpretation.
Shortcomings
Several possible shortcomings need to be addressed. First, 
in a modest amount of trials (11.9%, 19 out of 159 trials) 
there was premature bistability detection during memori-
zation. It is possible that some participants may have seen 
bistability during memorization without having reported 
this (otherwise they would have been excluded). However, 
this is unlikely if we consider that we base the 30.6% suc-
cessful reinterpretation rate in the Visual Only condition on 
participants who did not report (either voluntarily or when 
explicitly asked after the experiment) seeing bistability of 
any of the figures during memorization. This strongly sug-
gests that participants were successful in reinterpretation 
through visual imagery.
Similar to previous research (e.g., Brandimonte and Ger-
bino 1993; Hyman and Neisser 1991; Mast and Kosslyn 
2002), several participants detected both interpretations 
(e.g., doe and seal are detected during memorization), or 
the alternate interpretation was dominant (i.e., 26%). This 
raises potential worries about the robustness of the find-
ings. Is the proportion of participants that can reinterpret 
an alternate interpretation in visual imagery (30.6% in the 
visual only condition) based on a reliable estimate? We 
think this is likely the case because previous studies have 
obtained strikingly similar rates of reinterpretation (44% in 
Mast and Kosslyn 2002; 35% for Exp. 1 in Peterson et al. 
1992). Furthermore, we have recently gathered additional 
data (see Pouw, Aslanidou, Kamermans, & Paas, 2017; Exp. 
1 in Pouw, Fassi, Aslanidou, Kamermans, & Paas, under 
review) which in a comparable condition yielded a reinter-
pretation rate of 20.6% despite the fact that these participants 
did not receive an example figure of bistability (contrary 
to the current study which used the old woman/young lady 
to familiarize participants with bistable figures). Thus, the 
current study confirms that the estimate of 30.6% detection 
rate is credible, while excluding possible confounds of pre-
mature detection.
Another question that arises out of the current study is 
why some participants perceive ambiguity during perception 
while others do not. Unfortunately, the current study cannot 
directly address this question about the perceptual dynamics 
of ambiguity detection. However, there is a host of previous 
research that has shown that both bottom-up and top-down 
processes are at play in ambiguity detection (for a review 
see Scocchia, Valsecchi, & Triesch, 2014). For example, it 
has been shown that size of the figure can affect ambiguity 
detection (Goolkasian 1991). Once perceived, subjects are 
able to selectively maintain a percept through focus of atten-
tion (Meng and Tong 2004). Moreover, it has been found 
that creativity measures can predict individual differences 
in ambiguity detection (Doherty and Mair 2012). To con-
clude, there is a complex interplay between top-down and 
bottom-up processes that need to be understood before we 
can answer why there are individual differences in percep-
tion of ambiguity.
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It should further be noted that we have used a set of test 
figures that have not been used in previous research. This 
yielded unpredicted differences in detectability of bistabil-
ity as indicated by the statistically significant difference in 
detection rate for one particular figure. Namely, performance 
was significantly higher for the swan/elephant in all three 
conditions (see Table 2). However, this difference in detec-
tion rate does not alter the interpretation of the possibil-
ity of reinterpretation in visual imagery. Nor is this more 
readily reinterpretable figure conflating (lack of) differences 
between conditions, as figures were equally distributed over 
conditions.
Based on previous research on multimodality, we 
expected that haptic cues would support the quality of visual 
imagery, and therefore, increase reinterpretation (Dellanto-
nio and Spagnolo 1990; De Volder et al. 2001; Lacey, Camp-
bell, & Sathian, 2007; Prather and Sathian 2002; Röder and 
Rösler 1998). The confirmatory statistical analysis suggests 
that this was not the case when tested within participants 
who did not detect bistability in any of the three figures 
during the memorization phase. Given these null-results, 
we will refrain from interpreting this null-finding. Future 
studies should ensure sample sizes that are large enough 
to cope with considerable losses in data that are caused by 
issues inherent to bistable test figures used in studies on 
reinterpretation in visual imagery.
We have, however, gathered additional data regarding 
the possible supportive role of the haptic system in men-
tal imagery (Pouw et al. 2017; Exp. 1 in Pouw et al. under 
review; preprint [and data] available at https://osf.io/ct4m3/). 
In this recent study, subjects had to manually explore the 
visually ambiguous 2-D figures during memorization, with-
out visual perception (similar to our control condition in the 
present study). First, in the first experiment it was found that 
a small portion of the subjects that reinterpreted the memo-
rized figures in mental imagery produced gestures (without 
speech) as if manually exploring the figure. We interpret this 
finding as an indication that the haptic system may indeed 
support mental imagery performance. In a follow-up experi-
ment, we obtained that subjects who had to perform a sec-
ondary motor task during the reinterpretation of previously 
memorized figures (drumming their fingers on the table) 
underperform compared to subjects who do not move, or 
produce manual movements that follow the contours of the 
imagined figures. These results are a promising indication 
pointing toward a functional role of haptic cues in visual 
imagery processes.
Finally, note that the current study does not provide 
insight on why participants are (not) able to detect bista-
bility in visual imagery. For example, performance in the 
present study might be associated with mental rotation abil-
ities (Mast and Kosslyn 2002). Mast and Kosslyn (2002) 
presented the old woman/young lady as their test figure and 
found that successful reinterpretation in visual imagery was 
related to participants’ mental rotation ability. Similarly, our 
test figures also required an upside down rotation to ori-
ent the alternate interpretation. These similarities strongly 
suggest that mental rotation abilities have played a crucial 
role in which participants in our sample successfully rein-
terpreted the figure in imagery. Future research should be 
especially dedicated in further gauging factors that predict 
individual differences in reinterpretation performance. How-
ever, it may also be possible that differences occur later on 
in the reinterpretation process. Namely, it is possible that 
participants were able to retain and successfully rotate the 
image in visual imagery, but still failed to reinterpret the 
image because the initial percept (e.g., penguin) is simply 
too dominant (Chambers and Reisberg 1991). In such a case, 
participants rotate the original percept and cannot shift their 
understanding of the image beyond their original percept 
that now appears upside down (e.g., upside down penguin). 
As such, further research could focus on individual capaci-
ties to ascertain why some and not others are able to rein-
terpret their visual image, and where such differences occur 
in the reinterpretation process.
One could wonder if reinterpretation would have occurred 
in our sample if participants did not receive the instruction 
to rotate their mental image upside down. In fact, Hyman 
and Neisser (1991) found that the success of reinterpretation 
in imagery depends on specificity of the instructions. Their 
results showed that performance improved significantly 
depending on how much information was concealed within 
the instructions—similar to how performance in our sample 
generally increased with each subsequent question. There-
fore, future studies could investigate boundary conditions of 
ambiguity detection depending on instructions.
Conclusion
The current results validate previous research and repli-
cates its findings by showing that (a) visual images do not 
necessarily function as descriptions, and (b) can be used to 
accomplish similar cognitive acts as with pictorial repre-
sentations, and (c) bistability detection in visual imagery is 
difficult (as evidenced by low detection rates). If imagery 
were to function as descriptions, visual images brought forth 
from memory do not preserve raw spatial properties of the 
original source (e.g., duck), rather such spatial properties are 
encoded under a mode of presentation that is fixed, prevent-
ing reinterpretation by an imaginer. Inversely, the current 
results validate previous research according to which mental 
images preserve spatial information of an object remem-
bered, and showing that reinterpretations do not need the 
presence of visual cues.
 Psychological Research
1 3
Acknowledgements This research was funded by the Excellence Ini-
tiative grant from the Erasmus University Rotterdam awarded to the 
Educational Psychology section. We would like to thank Diane Pecher 
for helpful comments on the design of the study. We would also like 
to thank Bernhard Hommel, Christian Wallraven, and the anonymous 
reviewer for their insightful comments on the manuscript.
Compliance with ethical standards 
Conflict of interest The authors have no conflicts of interest to report.
Funding This research was funded by the Excellence Initiative grant 
from the Erasmus University Rotterdam awarded to the Educational 
Psychology section.
Ethical approval This experiment was designed and conducted in 
accordance with the guidelines of the ethical committee of the Depart-
ment of Psychology, Education, and Child Studies, at the Erasmus 
University Rotterdam. All procedures performed in studies involving 
human participants were in accordance with the ethical standards of 
the institutional and/or national research committee and with the 1964 
Helsinki declaration and its later amendments or comparable ethical 
standards.
Informed consent Informed consent was obtained from all individual 
participants included in the study.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative 
Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecom-
mons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribu-
tion, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate 
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the 
Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Appendix
See Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6.
Table 3  Alternatives offered 
per figure during the multiple 
choice question
Alternatives in bold are correct answers
Elephant/swan Doe/seal Giraffe/penguin
(A) Elephant–swan (A) Pigeon–squid (A) Crocodile–bear
(B) Butterfly–eagle (B) Turtle–parrot (B) Ostrich–owl
(C) Jellyfish–dinosaur (C) Doe–seal (C) Monkey–otter
(D) Flamingo–rhino (D)Rabbit–frog (D) Giraffe–penguin
Table 4  Correct interpretations 
based on visually perceived 
figures during memorization 
phase
Interpretations with asterisk were added post-hoc and based on the judgment of the experimenters
Orientation Seal/doe Swan/elephant Penguin/giraffe
Body orientation Seal/walrus* Swan/bird/ostrich/goose/ 
peacock*
Penguin
Head orientation Doe/deer/goat/cow/sheep/ 
giraffe/calf/foal/pig
Elephant/umbrella Giraffe/bull/cow/
deer/ goat*/
buck*
Table 5  Performance for 
natives and non-natives per test 
condition
Test condition Native Non-native
Visual only 8/20 (40%) 3/16 (18.8%)
Visual-haptic 8/19 (42.1%) 10/19 (52.6%)
Haptic control 10/24 (41.7%) 4/19 (21.1%)
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